Abstract
Introduction
Negotiation has long been an active research topic in the field of Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) [22] , MultiAgent Systems (MAS) [14] , Game Theory [23] , and more recently in agent-mediated e-Commerce [10, 11] . Negotiation refers to the process by which group of agents (human or software) communicate with one another in order to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on resource allocation (distribution) [9, 12] . Software agents are encapsulated computer systems situated in some environments such as the Internet and are capable of flexible, autonomous actions in that environment to meet their design objectives [24] . In the context of automated negotiation, software agents can autonomously and proactively conduct bargaining on behalf of their human users [3, 12] .
The Problems
Many real-world negotiation problems are characterised by combinatorially complex negotiation spaces which involve many issues. Under such circumstance, even experienced human negotiators will often be overwhelmed by the explosive number of alternatives. Consequently, suboptimal rather than optimal deals are made. Moreover, complete information about a negotiation space (e.g., the opponent's preferences) is generally not available to an agent to deliberate negotiation solutions. In realistic negotiation situations, negotiator's preferences may also change over time because of changing objectives or tasks at hand. These problems are compounded by the challenge that negotiators (human or software) are often bounded by limited computational resources and negotiation time [9, 12] . One of the ways to tackle these problems is to augment negotiation agents with learning and adaptation mechanisms so that these agents can learn from their opponents based on their previous encounters and continuously adapt to the changing negotiation contexts [15, 25] .
Related Work
Various learning and adaptation approaches such as Bayesian learning [25] , Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) [26] , and Genetic Algorithms (GA) [1, 20] have been explored to provide negotiation systems with learning and adaptation capabilities. However, these approaches are still primitive in terms of what can be learned (e.g., single issue only) and their sensitivity to the changing negotiation contexts.
It has been argued that the challenge of research in negotiation is to develop models that can track the shifting tactics of negotiators [15] . Accordingly, genetic algorithms based negotiation agents were developed to model the dynamic concession matching behaviour arising in bi-lateral negotiation situations [4, 15] . The set of feasible offers of a negotiation agent is represented by a population of chromosomes. Based on the standard genetic operators such as selection, crossover, and mutation, the population of chromosomes evolves over time and the fittest chromosome from the current generation is chosen as a tentative solution (i.e., a counter-offer). Rubenstein-Montano and Malaga have also reported a GA-based negotiation mechanism for searching optimal solutions for multiparty multi-objective negotiations under the assumption that preferences (i.e., the utility functions) of all the negotiation parties are available to a central negotiation mechanism [20] . Instead of using the evolutionary approach to develop an agent's concession generation mechanism, a GA has been used to learn optimal negotiation tactics given a particular negotiation situation (e.g., a predefined amount of negotiation time) [17] . A GA is also used to study the bargaining behaviour of boundedly rational agents in a single issue (e.g., price) bi-lateral negotiation situation [8] . It is found that the stable outcome generated by the GA model matches the equilibrium outcome identified by the corresponding game-theoretic model under certain conditions [8] .
Contributions
The main contribution of the work reported in this paper is the development of responsive (e.g., agents can take into account time pressure) and adaptive (e.g., agents can learn the opponent's changing preferences based on their moves in a negotiation session) negotiation agents to solve realworld negotiation problems. The issues such as time pressure, incomplete information, and bounded agent rationality arising in multi-party multi-issue negotiations have not been addressed properly by previous research work. Our current work proposes a GA-based agent model to alleviate these problems. The performance of our GA-based adaptive negotiation agents has been evaluated empirically and compared with that of a logic-based adaptive agent model [16] .
A Basic Negotiation Model
The basic negotiation model illustrated in this section is based on multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) [13] and is first discussed in [2] . This simple model can guarantee Pareto optimal if an agreement zone exists in a negotiation space. Therefore, we use it as a baseline model to evaluate the performance of our GA-based negotiation agents. 
Representing offers
An offer − → o =< d a1 , d a2 , . . . , d an > is
Representing negotiation preferences
(o) = a∈A U A p (a) × U Da p (d a ).
Computing concessions and generating offers
If an agent's initial proposal is rejected by its opponent, it needs to propose an alternative offer with the least utility decrement (i.e., computing a concession). An agent will maintain a set O p which contains the offers it has proposed before or the offer to be proposed in the current round. In a negotiation round, an alternative offer with a concession can be determined based on: 
Evaluating incoming offers
When an incoming offer o is received from an opponent, an agent p first evaluates if o ∈ O p is true (i.e., the offer satisfying all its hard constraints). It has been proved that if each participating agent p ∈ P employs their preference ordering ( p , O p ) to compute concessions and uses the offer acceptability criteria described above to evaluate incoming offers, Pareto optimal is always found if it exists in a negotiation space [2] . A solution is Pareto optimal if it is impossible to find another solution such that at least one agent will be better off but no agent will be worse off [19] . However, Pareto optimal does not necessarily lead to maximal joint payoff. Joint payoff simply refers to the sum of each agent's payoff obtained at the end of a negotiation.
Genetically Optimised Negotiation Agents
Development of our GA-based adaptive negotiation agents is driven by the basic intuition that negotiators tend to maximise their individual payoffs while ensuring that an agreement is reached [7, 15] . In each negotiation agent, a population of chromosomes is used to represent a subset of feasible offers. Since an agent knows its own utility function, an offer o max representing the offer with the maximal payoff can be identified. In addition, an offer o opponent represents the opponent's most recent counter-offer. According to the basic intuition, a feasible offer is considered fit if it is close to o max and o opponent . The distance from a feasible offer to o max and o opponent can be measured based on standard distance function such as the Mahalanobis distance [5] . In each negotiation round, the offer vectors o opponent and o max may change, and so are the offers considered fit by the agent. In other words, an agent is learning and adapting the opponent's preferences gradually.
Offer encoding
Each GA-based negotiation agent p utilises a population of chromosomes to represent a subset of feasible offers O feas p ⊆ O p . Each chromosome consists of a fixed number of fields. The first field uniquely identifies a chromosome, and the second field is used to hold the fitness value of the chromosome. The other fields (genes) represent the attribute values of a candidate offer. Figure 1 depicts the decimal encoding (Genotype) of some chromosomes and a two-point crossover operation. The genetic operators such as crossover and mutation are only applied to the genes representing the attribute values of an offer.
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The fitness function
The top t chromosomes (candidate offers) with the highest fitness are selected from a population to build the solution set S. If the size of S is 1, it means that the fittest chromosome from a population is chosen as an offer. In general, a stochastic selection function is applied to the solution set to choose a member as the solution (i.e., the current offer) in a particular negotiation round. Ideally, a fitness function should reflect the joint payoff of each candidate offer. Un-fortunately, the utility functions of the opponents are normally not available for real-world applications. Therefore, the proposed fitness function approximates the ideal function and captures three important issues: an agent's own payoff, the opponent's partial preference (e.g., the most recent counter offer), and time pressure:
where o max represents an offer which produces the maximal payoff based on an agent p's current utility function; − → o opponent is the offer vector representing the most recent counter-offer proposed by an opponent. The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is the trade-off factor to control the relative importance of optimising one's own payoff or reaching a deal (e.g., by considering the opponent's recent offer). In other words, α is used to model a wide spectrum of agent attitudes, from fully self-interested (α = 1) to fully benevolent (α = 0). 
is defined by the Mahalanobis distance [5] with the general form:
where R is a positive definite matrix defining the Mahalanobis space (a pooled sample covariance matrix). For our application, R is a positive diagonal matrix with each non-zero element w i ∈ (0, 1] lining up on the diagonal of R. It turns out that such Mahalanobis distances become the weighted Euclidean distances:
where the weight factor w i = U For practical negotiations arising in business contexts, time pressure is often an important factor for concession generation. When the negotiation deadline is close, an agent is more likely to concede in order to make a deal. However, different agents may have different attitudes towards deadlines. An agent may be eager to reach a deal and so it will concede quickly (Conceder agent). On the other hand, an agent may not give ground easily during negotiation (Boulware agent) [18] . Therefore, a time pressure function T P is developed to approximate a wide spectrum of agent attitudes towards time. Our T P function is similar to the negotiation decision function referred to in the literature [6, 9] . 
Figure 2. Agent Attitudes Towards Deadline
T P (t) denotes the time pressure given the time t represented by the absolute time or the number of negotiation rounds; t d p indicates the deadline for an agent p and it is either expressed as absolute time or the maximum number of rounds allowed. The term e p denotes the agent p's eagerness factor for negotiation. An agent p is Boulware if 0 < e p < 1 is set; for a conceder agent, e p > 1 is true. If e p = 1 is established, the agent holds Linear attitude towards the deadline. The values of the T P function are within the unit interval [0, 1]. The eagerness factor e p can be chosen by the user or else a system default is assumed before a negotiation process begins. Figure 2 shows the examples of 7 agent attitudes towards deadline (with eagerness factor e p = 50, 10, 5, 1, 0.1, 0.5, 0.02). For instance, for a Boulware agent with e p = 0.02, its original preference maintains the same (e.g., discount factor = 1) until the negotiation deadline is approaching (e.g., fraction of time > 0.9).
The Genetic Algorithm
An agent's adaptive negotiation strategy is developed based on the following genetic algorithm:
CREATE the first population P 0 which consists of o max and N − 1 individuals randomly selected from the set
END WHILE
The initial population P 0 is created by incorporating the member o max that maximises an agent p's payoff in the first round, and by randomly selecting the N − 1 members from the candidate set O p , where N is the pre-defined population size. At the beginning of each evolution cycle, the fitness value of each chromosome is computed based on the most current negotiation parameters (e.g., an agent's utility function and the opponent's counter-offer). Elitism is incorporated by executing the Best function to copy the e% fittest chromosomes from the current generation P i to the new generation P i+1 . By executing the Selection function, either Tournament selection [17] or Roulette-wheel selection can be used to create a mating pool MP .
For tournament selection, a group of k members are selected from a population to form a tournament. The member with the highest fitness among the selected k members is placed in the mating pool. This procedure is repeated n times until the mating pool is full. Standard genetic operators: cloning, crossover, mutation are applied to the mating pool to create new members according to pre-defined probabilities. These operations continue until the new generation of size N is created. Cloning simply means creating a member in the new generation by exactly copying from a chromosome in the previous generation. Two-point crossover is used to exchange the fields (offer attribute values) between two parents to create two new members. In each two-point crossover operation, two points are randomly selected and the fields within the boundary defined by the two points are exchanged. An example of a basic crossover operation is depicted in Figure 1 . In addition, more sophisticated crossover operation involves searching for new genes based on the parents' fitness. For the enhanced crossover, two points are still randomly selected. However, instead of simply swapping the genes between two parents, these genes (i.e., attribute values) are computed according to: Mutation involves randomly replacing some attribute values encoded on a chromosome by other attribute values from the permissible attribute domains of an agent. Therefore, the proposed mutation operation will not generate offer values which are not acceptable to an agent. In addition, adaptive mutation rate is used in our genetic algorithm. The mutation rate is inversely proportional to the average fitness of a population: Rate adaptive = 1 F itnessavg . A baseline mutation rate is defined by the user of a negotiation agent. Then, the effective mutation rate is derived from the product of the adaptive rate and the baseline mutation rate in each evolution cycle. An evolution cycle is invoked after every x negotiation round(s), where x is the evolution frequency defined by the user. There is another parameter (number of evolutions) to define the number of evolutions to be performed in an evolution cycle. This parameter corresponds to the exit criteria defined in our GA.
After an offer with concession is computed, the agent's decision for an incoming offer can also be developed. If the incoming counter-offer produces a payoff greater than or equal to that of the current proposal, a rational agent should accept the incoming offer; otherwise the incoming counteroffer should be rejected.
The Experiments
The negotiation spaces of our experiment were characterized by bilateral negotiations between a buyer agent p B and a seller agent p S . Each negotiation profile consists of 4 attributes with each attribute domain containing 4 discrete values represented by the natural numbers D a = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The valuation of an attribute or a discrete attribute value was in the interval of (0, 1]. For each negotiation case, an agreement zone always exists since the difference between a buyer and a seller only lies on their valuations against the same set of negotiation issues (e.g., attributes and attribute values). For each agent p, the size of the feasible offer set is O p = 4 4 = 256. 5 negotiation groups with each group containing 10 cases were constructed. For each negotiation case in a group, the negotiation profile (e.g., the preferences) of a buyer was randomly created according to the configuration mentioned before (i.e., 4 attributes with each attribute containing a value d i ∈ D a ). A buyer's profile was then copied to create a seller's profile. The seller's profile was modified with various levels of preferential difference introduced (i.e., modifying the valuations of some attributes and attribute values).
For the first simulation group, each negotiation case contained identical buyer/seller preferences (i.e., the same weights for the attributes and the same valuations against the same set of attribute values). This group was used as a control group and the other groups were the experimental groups. Each negotiation case in the second group contained 20% preferential difference between a buyer and a seller (e.g., one valuation of an attribute value is different). Each case in the succeeding group was injected a 20% increment of preferential difference. The genetic parameters were: population size = 30, mating pool size = 20, size of solution set = 1, elitism factor = 10%, tournament size = 2, cloning rate = 0.2, crossover rate = 0.6, baseline mutation rate = 0.01, Number of evolutions per cycle = 5, and evolution frequency = 1 (i.e., one evolution cycle per negotiation round). Tournament selection, basic two-point crossover, and adaptive mutation rate were used for the experiment reported in this paper. The negotiation trade-off factor α = 0.5 and the negotiation deadline = 50 (rounds) were set for each negotiation session. The agents' performance was measured in terms of joint-payoff (i.e., the sum of each individual's utility). If an agreement could not be made after the deadline was reached, zero utility was assumed for each agent. Table 2 . Comparative negotiation performance GA vs. Logic The purpose of the first experiment was to study the general performance of the GA-based adaptive negotiation agents when compared with the baseline negotiation model (Section 2) which guarantees Pareto optimal. Both the buyer agent and the seller agent were Boulware agents with eagerness factor e p = 0.5. All the simulation runs (each case in the 5 negotiation groups) were performed on our negotiation server with the configuration of a single Pentium III 800 MHz CPU and 512MB main memory. Both the GAbased negotiation agents and the negotiation agents in our baseline system dealt with exactly the same set of negotiation cases. Table 1 summarizes the average joint-payoff for each negotiation group. A positive ∆ utility indicates that the GAbased negotiation agents are more effective than the baseline negotiation system. An overall results of ∆ utility = 18.8% was obtained. Since the proposed GA-based negotiation agents can observe their opponents' preferences and continuously learn this information via the opponents' counter-offers, the search for a mutually acceptable offer becomes faster. Moreover, as the GA-based negotiation agents were responsive to time pressure, most of the agreements could be reached on or before the deadline. On the other hand, the basic negotiation system which can guarantee Pareto optimal failed to develop some negotiation solutions with the present of time pressure.
For the control negotiation group (group 1), both systems could successfully identify all the negotiation given exactly the same preferences of the negotiators. In fact, both systems could identify the solution in the first round for each case in the first negotiation group. In general, the performance gap between these two negotiation systems becomes larger if the preferential differences between the buyer and the seller are bigger. The reason is that the GA-based negotiation agents are equipped with effective learning mechanisms to learn and adapt to the opponents' preferences even though the preferential differences between the parties are big. Our second experiment compared the performance of our GA-based adaptive negotiation agents with that of the belief revision logic based adaptive negotiation agents [16] under the same experimental setting as the first experiment. For the logic-based negotiation agents, persuasive negotiation was activated such that each agent would disclose its preference (i.e., the entrenchment degree) for one attribute value in each counter-offer. The results were shown in Table 2. It is shown that the GA-based and the logic-based adaptive negotiation agents have comparable performance in our simulation runs.
Conclusions and Future Work
Real-world negotiation problems are characterised by combinatorially complex negotiation spaces, tough negotiation deadlines, limited information about the opponents, and volatile negotiator preferences. Therefore, practical negotiation agents must be equipped with effective learning mechanisms to automatically acquire domain knowl-edge from the negotiation environments and continuously adapt to the changing negotiation contexts. Our proposed GA-based adaptive negotiation agents are empowered by an effective genetic algorithm which takes into account an agent's self-payoff, the opponent's preferences, and the time pressure. Therefore, these GA-based adaptive negotiation agents can identify near optimal solutions based on limited information about the negotiation spaces. Our initial experiments show that under time pressure, the GA-based adaptive negotiation agents outperform the theoretically optimal negotiation agents which guarantee Pareto optimal. In addition, the performance of our GA-based agents is comparable to the logic-based adaptive negotiation agents. Future work includes the evaluation of our agents based on real negotiation cases and the improvement of the genetic algorithm by taking into account the market-oriented factors in multi-lateral negotiations.
